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Abstract
Some common fallacies about fundamental themes of Logic are ex-
posed: the First and Second incompleteness Theorem interpretations,
Chaitin’s various superficialities and the usual classification of the ax-
iomatic Theories in function of its language order.
KEYWORDS: Incompleteness, undecidability, semantic completeness, categoric-
ity, randomness, Chaitin’s constant, first and second order languages,
consistency.
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1. Prologue
Regularly, after having enjoyed the fruits of the genius of an extraordinary man,
we have to suffer the dogmatism of any his conclusions: everything he said is
gold. In physics, an experiment can eliminate the most stubborn opinion, but if
the matter is in relation with pure philosophy, things are much more complicated
and rarely solvable in a compulsory manner.
However, in some sectors "applied" of philosophy, such as in mathematical
Logic, since some time is possible - and imperative - to require accuracy and
rigor. Hilbert’s formalism introduced by the late nineteenth century, in fact,
has equipped the axiomatic Disciplines with a orderly symbolism, deprived of
the ambiguity of any intuitive intervention and regimented to a rigorous epis-
temological analysis. As a consequence, the modern Logic has been capable of
remarkable results, led by the astonishing Gödel’s theorems.
Despite the above, still today several serious errors are common in this mat-
ter. These lapses, combined with the use of a dated terminology which today is
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indubitably insidious and insufficient, are hindering the spread of this invaluable
and fascinating knowledge, and not only in the humanistic field.
Here, I will try to clarify briefly some of these confusions, citing some text
where it is possible to find more depth.
2. The pressure of a sentence
The first point concerns the range of applicability of the Gödel’s First incom-
pleteness Theorem. We omit, now, both the statement and the very important
consequences of this famous theorem, that the reader can find in any good book
on Logic. The thing to emphasize here is just that the same hypothesis of the
Theorem require the enumerability of the set of theorems and proofs of the
Theory to which it can be applied1. As a preliminary to the demonstration,
Gödel established a special numerical code (called briefly gödelian) both for
propositions and demonstrations. When applied to the formal2 Theory of nat-
ural numbers (or Peano Arithmetic, PA from now), this encoding makes every
proposition and every demonstrations be assigned a numeric code, unique and
exclusive. But what’s happen if you do the same with an arithmetic Theory
that has got a number not enumerable of theorems? This Theory exists and
is usually called "second order Arithmetic". In its premises there is a meta-
mathematic axiomatic scheme that, generalizing the principle of induction of
PA, introduces one axiom for each element of P(N), the set of all the subsets
of natural numbers. We will call briefly complete this induction. Since this set
is, as well known, not enumerable, it follows that also the sets of theorems and
proofs are not enumerable. Therefore, in this Theory, not all the proofs can have
got a different gödelian: else its would be enumerable. The not-denumerability
of the proofs reveals the indispensable use of a intrinsically semantic strategy
(ie with use of not fully codifiable meanings) to derive the theorems.
Even if we want to consider the principle of complete induction as one sym-
bolic formula, ie as a single semantic axiom, this axiom is not decidable (or just
effectively enumerable), since its semanticity is not removable. This last con-
clusion is reached, for example, representing the Theory inside the formal Set
Theory3: the axiom has to be translated to an axiomatic scheme that generates
a number not enumerable of inductive axioms4.
The simple consequence is that the First incompleteness Theorem can not be
applied to the second order Arithmetic5. However, this ambiguity has been long
1A set is said enumerable if it exists a biunivoc correspondence between its elements and
the natural numbers.
2Throughout the article, with the adjective "formal" we wish to mean "empty of explicit
meaning", or "symbolic", "syntactic", "codified".
3Anyone between NBG, ZF or MK.
4Indeed, a common mistake is to believe that a finite number of statements is always
decidable. More in: G. Raguní, Confines lógicos de la Matemática, revista cultural La Torre
del Virrey - Nexofía, free on the Web: http://www.latorredelvirrey.es/nexofia/pdf/Confines-
logicos-de-la-matematica.pdf (2011), pp. 153-158 and 293-295.
5In fact in this Theory, the statement of Gödel, whose standard interpretation is "there is
no code for a proof of this statement" is not equivalent to "I am not provable in this Theory",
2
and loudly spread everywhere, even in specifically technical areas6. About this
subjet, often is perceived a typical strange lack of rigor (perhaps ill-concealed
hint of doubt). For example is repeated usually that "also the second order
Arithmetic, since it contains the axioms of PA, is subdued by the incompleteness
Theorem". Forgetting that also must be kept the effective axiomatizability.
Emblematic is the case of the Theory obtained from PA by adding, as axioms,
all the statements true in the standard model of PA: it also contains all the
axioms of PA, but it is complete.
Really, it is even possible that the second order Arithmetic is syntactically
complete, although its language is semantically incomplete. Since this Theory
is not-formal, the answer to this interesting question could come only from the
Metamathematics7.
There is no doubt that this situation is due to the overreverence for the
Gödel’s figure. In the presentation of his incompleteness Theorem in the Congress
of Königsberg (1930), Gödel announced the result as "a proof of the semantic
incompleteness of Arithmetic, since it is categorical"8. He speaks, undoubtedly,
of the second order Arithmetic which, unlike PA, is categorical9. Gödel, there-
fore, based his claim by applying - wrongly - the First Incompleteness Theorem
to the second order Arithmetic: in fact, semantic incompleteness derives from
syntactic incompleteness and categoricity. Despite the error, the conclusion is
correct: as a result of Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem10, categoricity and infinity
of a model are sufficient to ensure semantic incompleteness of the language of
any arbitrary Theory. However, before 1936, when it became popular the gen-
eralization of Malcev, no logician, including Skolem and Gödel, realized all the
puzzling consequences of this important Theorem.
Now, being the greatest logician of all time, the question is not only what
led him to error, but also why his claim has never been subsequently corrected.
It is not easy to answer to the first question. It should be noted that Gödel,
at least up to 1930, rarely distinguishes the two types of arithmetic Theories,
so logically different each from one. Indeed in that period, neither he nor any
other logician sometimes highlights the intrinsic semanticity of Theories with
an uncountable number of statements. And the consequences of it.
Everyone can well understand, on the other hand, why we don’t have got
any kind of correction about the above announcement. In fact it involves an
as in PA.
6Just two examples: <‌<ovviamente il primo teorema d’incompletezza è dimostrabile an-
che nell’Aritmetica al secondo ordine>‌>, E. Moriconi, I teoremi di Gödel, SWIF (2006), on
the Web: http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/biblioteca/lr/public /moriconi-1.0.pdf, p. 32; C.
Wright, On Quantifying into Predicate Position: Steps towards a New(tralist) Perspective
(2007), p. 22. In this last work, maybe it is significant that the author discusses this property
with a number of delicate epistemologic questions. Anyway, in both cases the property is
considered "obvious" without further explanation.
7G. Raguní, op. cit. (footnote n. 4), p. 296-297 .
8K. Gödel, Collected Works I: publications 1929-1936, eds. S. Feferman et al., Oxford
University Press (1986), p. 26-29.
9A Theory is said categorical if it admits a single model up to isomorphism. In simpler
words (but also more inaccurate), if it has got a single correct interpretation.
10We include here, both the "up" and "down" version.
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argument - semantic completeness / incompleteness and its relation with cat-
egoricity - that basically, as it was afterward understood, has nothing to do
with the syntactic completeness and therefore with the First incompleteness
Theorem. During the 30’s, this subject was very topical, especially because of
Hilbert’s concerns about the categoricity. Gödel began showing that the formal
classical language11 is semantically complete: if it is consistent, always has got
at least one model12. It followed that any formal classical Theory syntactically
incomplete, ie, with at least one undecidable statement I, could not be categor-
ical. Because it supports at least two nonisomorphic models: one for which I is
true and another for which is false. In addition, Gödel continued believing - as
tacitly assumed by Hilbert and any other logician at time - that the syntactic
completeness of a formal Theory (or, more generally, of a Theory with a seman-
tically complete language) should imply its categoricity. Consequently the First
incompleteness Theorem was seen, just after its acceptance, as an instrument
capable of discriminating the categorical nature and / or the semantic complete-
ness of the axiomatic Systems. For example, the formal arithmetic Theory, ie
PA, was believed to be not categorical because syntactically incomplete.
As noted above, the full understanding of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem
showed, after a few years, that categoricity is impossible for all the formal
(or, more generally, with a semantically complete language) Systems equipped
with at least one infinite model (the case of the ordinary Disciplines). So, this
fact is true regardless if the Theory is syntactically complete or not. Thus,
the subject matter was finally deciphered by consequences of the Completeness
Theorem (from which, in fact, the same Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem derives).
Neither Gödel, or other alert logician, had ever any good reason to return to a
phrase that, ultimately, had diverted, at least, about the consequences of the
First incompleteness Theorem. Which certainly were very deep, but concerning
essentially different features. The most significant related to the new and dis-
ruptive concept of machine, as it was elucidated mainly by Church, Turing and
subsequently Chaitin.
The sad postscript is that, still today, are frequent claims that, in essence,
ratified the Gödel’s unfortunate sentence without any correction. For example:
<‌<the syntactic incompleteness of the first order arithmetic causes the semantics
incompleteness of the second order logic>‌>13. Overlooking the terminology of
"expressive order" (that is in effect ambiguous, as we will try to show later),
these words seem, firstly, to suggest the automatic transmission of syntactic
incompleteness to the expanded System, ie to the second order one (first mis-
take). Secondly, from syntactic incompleteness and categoricity it is deduced
the semantic incompleteness (second lapse: it would sufficient the categoricity
plus the infinity of a model).
11We prefer to use this expression rather than the more usual "First Order Classical Logic"
for reasons that will become clear in paragraph 4.
12Semantic Completeness Theorem, 1929.
13E. Moriconi, ibidem (footnote n. 6), traslated by the author. A similar phrase is repeated
in the abstract of F. Berto, Gödel’s first theorem, ed. Tilgher Genova, fasc. Epistemologia 27,
n.1 (2004).
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On the other hand, neither for the language of the integral Theory of reals
(at second order, in its original version), informal and categorical System, it
is valid the semantic completeness Theorem. Despite that its formal version,
expressed at first order, is syntactically complete (as was shown by Tarski).
Evidently, the semantic incompleteness of the language of this Theory is just
due to its categoricity plus the infinity of the standard model. Here, what role
should be played by the syntactic incompleteness of PA?
Even in a more recent book, it is proposed to deduce semantic incompleteness
of the "second-order logic" either exploiting the First incompleteness Theorem
or the Church-Turing Theorem14. In the first case the theorem is illegally ap-
plied to the second-order Arithmetic. In the second case, the author - agree with
others scholars - founds the proof on the fact that <‌< if [by contradiction] the
second-order logic were [semantically] complete, then there should be a [effec-
tive] procedure of enumeration of the valid formulas for the second order... >‌>15.
However, this consequence assumes that the set of the second order formulas is
enumerable. But now, if with the expression "second-order logic" we decide to
indicate a countable System, then the categorical Arithmetic is not included in
it!
Indeed, until syntactic incompleteness (or completeness) of second order
Arithmetic remains unproven, we do not distinguish alternatives to use of the
Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem to demonstrate the semantic incompleteness of its
language.
Finally, it is often repeated also the old slip that the non-categoricity of the
formal Arithmetic, ie PA, is caused by its syntactic incompleteness. That is sort
of like saying that the infinity of polygons is caused by the infinity of isosceles
triangles.
3. Chaitin’s licenses
In 1970, Gregory Chaitin formulated an interesting informatic version of the
First incompleteness Theorem. In its most simple presentation, it states that
any machine that verify the Church-Turing Thesis16can proof the randomness
of a necessarily finite number of symbolic strings. The randomness of a sym-
bolic string is defined by the impossibility, for the machine itself, to compress
it beyond a certain degree (which has to be fixed before). For any machine,
exists an infinite and predominant number of random strings: in fact it is easy
to conclude that the probability, for a fixed machine, to compress an arbitrary
finite string of symbols is always quite low (except to consider a really trivial
compression degree). Nonetheless, compressible strings remain certainly infi-
14C. L. De Florio, Categoricità e modelli intesi, ed. Franco Angeli (2007).
15C. L. De Florio, op. cit., p. 54, traslated by the author.
16This famous "Thesis" is just the assumption that all the machines are logically repro-
ducible using recursive functions and vice versa. The recursive functions representing all
possible arithmetic field of calculability. More accurate and detailed explanations can be
found in any good book on Logic.
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nite; furthermore has to be emphasized that any ordinary human creation, still
encoded in symbols, is almost always non-random17.
Thanks to the Chaitin’s interpretation we know that any machine can indi-
cate only a finite number of strings that itself cannot compress. As a result, no
compression program, always stopping, can be certainty stated as ideal, ie not
improvable: by contradiction, it would be able to determine the randomness
of any random string, by virtue of failing to compress it; in violation of this
incompleteness Theorem version18.
Unfortunately Chaitin has released many superficial statements, often un-
even, which produce dangerous confusion about the incompleteness subject,
already in itself not so easy. The fact that these conclusions are valid also
for universal machines19, has led him, first, to neglect that the definition of
randomness always, in any case, is referred with respect to a particular fixed
machine. Moreover, for the obvious fact that, on any ordinary computer, the
natural numbers are represented by symbolic strings, he has precipitously as-
signed the randomness property to the natural numbers. As a result of this light-
ness, Chaitin has repeatedly proclaimed to have discovered the "randomness in
Arithmetic"20.
We reiterate that the randomness property (originally defined by A. Kol-
morov) only concerns the strings of characters and affects the natural numbers
just for the code chosen for them. Encoding is totally arbitrary by the point of
view of the Logic. In effect it is possible, in a specific machine, to use a code
that, although unquestionably uncomfortable and expensive in bits, makes finite
the amount of random natural numbers (or, more exactly, of the strings which
represent them)21. Furthermore, as before stated, the same randomness of a
symbolic string is not absolute, but relative with respect to the code and inner
working of the prefixed machine. Given an arbitrary and long enough string
that is random for a particular machine, there is nothing to ban the existence of
another machine, possibly designed ad hoc, which gets to compress it. For that
machine, predictably, some strings that are compressible for the first machines,
will be instead random.
17Hence the success of file compression techniques known as "loss-less", ie without loss or
corruption of data, such as "zip", "tar" and so on. However, for products with superior
randomness, such as videos and music, compression methods can be effective only with loss
or alteration of data: the formats "jpeg" and "mp3" are examples.
18G. Raguní, op. cit., p. 273.
19A machine is said universal if it is able to reproduce logically the behavior of any other
machine. Its existence derives, by the Church-Turing Thesis, from the existence of universal
recursive functions. An example of universal machine is any PC, however modest, but with
unlimited expandable memory.
20Two examples: "I have shown that there is randomness in the branch of pure mathematics
known as number theory. My work indicates that - to borrow Einstein’s metaphor - God
sometimes plays dice with whole numbers!" Randomness in Arithmetic, Scientific American
259, n. 1 (July 1988); "In a nutshell, Gödel discovered incompleteness, Turing discovered
uncomputability, and I discovered randomness", preface to the book The unknowable, ed.
Springer-Verlag, Singapore (1999). This kind of frases, however, is repeated in almost all his
publications, including the most recent.
21Two examples in G. Raguní, op. cit., p. 276 and 281-282.
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In the same article of Scientific American cited in the penultimate footnote,
Chaitin writes:
How have the incompleteness theorem of Gödel, the halting prob-
lem of Turing and my own work affected mathematics? The fact is
that most mathematicians have shrugged off the results [...]. They
dismiss the fact as not applying directly to their work. Unfortunately
[...] algorithmic information theory has shown that incompleteness
and randomness are natural and pervasive. This suggests to me that
the possibility of searching for new axioms applying to the whole
numbers should perhaps be taken more seriously.
Indeed, the fact that many mathematical problems have remained
unsolved for hundreds and even thousands of years tends to support
my contention. Mathematicians steadfastly assume that the failure
to solve these problems lies strictly within themselves, but could the
fault not lie in the incompleteness of their axioms? For example, the
question of whether there are any perfect odd numbers has defied an
answer since the time of the ancient Greeks. Could it be that the
statement "There are no odd perfect numbers" is unprovable? If it
is, perhaps mathematicians had better accept it as an axiom.
This may seem like a ridiculous suggestion to most mathemati-
cians, but to a physicist or a biologist it may not seem so absurd. [...]
Actually in a few cases mathematicians have already taken unproved
but useful conjectures as a basis for their work.
These words seem to suggest the "gödelian revolution" of a "new" Mathemat-
ics, empirical type, which really has always existed: one which makes use of
conjectures. To consider these last as axioms without no metamathematic jus-
tification would be obviously unwise as well as useless. And it does not sound
like a progress but like a resigned presumption: it desists, a priori, to search for
meta-demostrations which often have been precious sources of development for
Logic and Mathematics. Indeed, for no undecidable formula, the incompleteness
Theorem impedes the possibility to distinguish it by a purely metamathematic
reasoning. This erroneous view is repeated, with enthusiasm, in almost all his
recent work: in fact, on the (epidermal, certainly not logic) basis of the incom-
pleteness Theorem, he goes so far as to question the same opportunity of the
axiomatic Systems22!
The swedish Logician Torkel Franzén, died recently, exposed other mistakes
of Chaitin in 200523. Here, we refer just one. In the abstract of an article,
Chaitin states: <‌<Gödel’s theorem may be demonstrated using arguments hav-
ing an information-theoretic flavor. In such an approach it is possible to argue
that if a theorem contains more information than a given set of axioms, then
22G. Chaitin, The halting probability Ω: irreducible complexity in pure mathematics,
Milan Journal of Mathematics n. 75 (2007), p. 2 y ss.
23T. Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem: an incomplete guide to its use and abuse, AK Peters (2005).
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it is impossible for the theorem to be derived from the axioms>‌>24. The phrase
incorrectly confuses the property that for any machine there are always infinite
random strings, with the proving capability of the machine itself (which is sub-
ject to the incompleteness Theorem). Franzén confutes the assertion in a simple
and irrefutable way: by the single axiom "∀x (x=x )", having constant complex-
ity, one can obtain a theorem, type "n = n", having arbitrarily large complexity
by increasing the number n. Indeed, that is guaranteed if the natural numbers
are encoded by any usual exponential code.
The constant Ω, introduced by Chaitin with respect to a fixed universal ma-
chine, represents the probability that a random routine of the machine stops.
Its unquestionable interest lies in the fact that it represents a kind of best com-
pression of mathematical knowledge: knowledge of the first n bits of Ω can solve
the halting problem for all programs of length less than or equal to n. However,
Chaitin greatly exaggerates its importance, as far as to describe Ω as the way
to obtain the mathematical knowledge25. Naturally, the number Ω is just a
fantastic, insuperable way to summarize this knowledge. After having obtained
it by the traditional theorems and meta-theorems.
This criticism is not meant to attack the figure of this great informatic
logician, but just to clarify a picture that shows still quite confused, not only to
non-experts.
4. A tired classification
We now wish to criticize the current classification of the classical axiomatic
Theories in function of its expressive order: first order, second order, etc..26.
Unfortunately, it has been consolidated over the years the view that the formal-
ity of language (or, more generally, its semantic completeness) is a prerogative
of the first expressive order and, moreover, that higher-order language are all
necessarily semantic (typically, uncountable). The error is mainly due to two
misunderstandings.
The first is linked to the meaning of First Order Classical Logic. This expres-
sion usually refers to the collection of all the Classic Predictive Calculi. Each
Classical Predictive Calculus is a first order formal Theory that has got: a)
some basic first order axioms, specified for the first time by Russell and White-
24G. Chaitin, Gödel’s Theorem and Information, International Journal of Theoretical
Physics, n. 22 (1982).
25For example, in the article: Meta-mathematics and the foundations of Mathematics,
EATCS Bulletin, vol. 77, pp. 167-179 (2002), he exposes a method that in principle should
be able to solve the Riemann hypothesis from knowing a sufficient number of bits of Ω. But
the argument is a clear vicious circle.
26A language is said of the first-order if the quantifiers “∃” and “∀” only may refer to
variables (as in the phrase "every line that is parallel to line r also is parallel to line t"). At
second order, also it can be quantified on the predicates (and to translate phrases like: "Every
relationship that exists between the lines r and s also exists between the lines r and t"). At
third order it can be quantified also on super-predicates (relations between predicates) and so
on to infinity.
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head, which formalize the concepts of "not", "or" and "exists"27; b) some other
own axioms, again enumerable and at first order, which formalize some partic-
ular concepts that have to be used in the Theory (eg, "equal", "greater than",
"orthogonal", etc.); c) the four classical deductive rules: substitution, particu-
larization, generalization and modus ponens. Since these rules consist of purely
syntactic operations on axioms and/or theorems (ie are applied, mechanically,
just to symbolic code of the statements), in any Predictive Calculus - and so in
the whole Classical First Order Logic - the formality is always verified. However,
this fact does not mean that every first order Theory, founded on a particular
Classical Predictive Calculus and deducting only by the four classic rules, must
be formal. Nothing prevents, for example, that a Theory add an uncountable
number of own axioms to this Calculus, although all expressed at first-order
language: it would result an intrinsically semantic and therefore not formal lan-
guage. The First Order Classical Logic, in other words, does not include all the
classical first order Theories. Infinitely many of them use an informal and/or
semantically incomplete language28.
The second mistake is related to the Lindström’s Theorem. This states that
any classical Theory expressed in a semantically complete language can be for-
mulated by a first order language. The disorder stems to confuse "can" with
"must". The theorem does not forbid the semantic completeness, or formality,
of higher-order languages. It only states that when you have just this case,
the Theory can be re-expressed more easily at first order language. Unques-
tionably, this property distinguishes the particular importance of the first order
expressions. A property, on the other hand, that already is evident thanks to the
expressive capability of the formal Set Theory: any formal System, in fact, since
is fully representable inside this Theory - which is of first order - is expressible
at the first order. But this importance should not be radicalized.
Surely, the evident fact that the second order languages are typically un-
countable, and therefore intrinsically semantic, aggravates the situation. That
happens because, if the model is infinite, in the most general case the predi-
cates vary within a certainly not enumerable set. But nothing preclude that
the axioms limit this variability to a countable subset and that, in particular,
the formality is respected29. A concrete example is the System obtained from
PA, expressing the partial induction principle, ie limited to formulas with at
least one free variable, by a single symbolic formula (instead of by a meta-
mathematic axiomatic scheme). It results a second-order axiom which still has
to be interpreted semantically, since the premises of the Theory do not specify
any syntactic deduction with second order formulas. However, this semantics
is not intrinsic, ie ineliminable: if we represent the System inside the formal
27Other usual classical concepts, such as "and", "imply" and "every", are defined by them.
The first two can be unificated by an unique connective like NAND (or NOR, Sheffer 1913).
28In agree: M. Rossberg, First-Order Logic, Second-Order Logic, and Completeness, Hen-
dricks et al. (eds.) Logos Verlag Berlin (2004), on the Web:
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~mr30/papers/RossbergCompleteness.pdf
29In agree: HB Enderton, Second order and Higher order Logic, Standford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (2007), on the Web: http://plato.standford.edu/entries/logic-higher-order/.
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Set Theory, this axiom is translated to a set-theoretic axiomatic scheme that
generates an enumerable number of formal inductive axioms. Therefore, in the
same original Theory, the formality could be restored by adding the appropriate
premises with which syntactically operate from the second order induction ax-
iom, so as to produce the required theorems about the symbolically declarable
properties. But, naturally, there are strategies more simple to reconstitute the
formality30.
As a result of this confusion, the non-formal nature of the second (or more)
order Theories is often criticized, on the base of intrinsic semanticity in some of
these. And others scholars, rather than highlight that the problem does not lie
in the kind of expressive order, but in the particular nature of the premises of the
Theory, contest that "also some second order Systems have a formal appearance
like those of the first order". In any case, like some of the first order!
In conclusion, the cataloging of classical axiomatic Theories in function of
its language order, in general, misleads about their basic logical properties.
Those are consequence of the structure of the premises, whereas the language
order not always plays a decisive role. The main instrument of classification
remains the respect of the Hilbert’s formality or, more generally, of the semantic
completeness.
5. About the interpretation of the Second incom-
pleteness Theorem
Finally, we have to disrupt the usual interpretation of the Second incompleteness
Theorem. In reference to a Theory that satisfies the same hypothesis of the
First incompleteness Theorem, the Second one generalizes the undecidability
to a class of statements which, interpreted in the standard model mean "this
System is consistent." Its complex demonstration, only outlined by Gödel, was
published by Hilbert and Bernays in 1939.
The usual interpretation of this Theorem, object of our criticism, is that
"every Theory that satisfies the hypotheses of the First incompleteness Theorem
can not prove its own consistency." It seems clear, in fact, that the conclusion
that a Theory can not prove its own consistency is valid for all the classical
Systems, including non-formal! Moreover, this conclusion does not correspond
to the Second incompleteness Theorem, but to a new metatheorem.
Consider an arbitrary classical System. If it is inconsistent, it is deprived
of models and therefore of any reasonable interpretation of any statement31.
Therefore, only the admitting that a given statement of the Theory means
something, implies agreeing consistency. And indubitably this also applies if
the interpretation of the statement is "this System is consistent".
So, if there is no assurance about the consistency of the Theory (which,
to want to dig deep enough, applies to any mathematical Discipline) we can’t
30G. Raguní, op. cit., p. 160-161.
31More in depth: of any interpretation respecting the principles of contradiction and ex-
cluded third.
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be certain on any interpretation of its language. For example, in the case of
the usual Geometry, when we prove the pythagorean Theorem, what we really
conclude is "if the System supports the Euclidean model (and therefore is con-
sistent), then in every rectangle triangle c1
2+c22=I
2
". Certainly, a deduction
with undeniable epistemological worth, still in the catastrophic possibility of
inconsistence.
But now let’s see what’s happen if a certain theorem of a certain Theory
is interpreted with the meaning: "this System is consistent" in a given inter-
pretation M. Similarly, what we can conclude by this theorem is really: "if the
System supports the model M (and therefore is consistent), then the System
is consistent." Something that we already knew and, above all, that does not
demonstrate at all the consistency of the System. Unlike any other statement
with a different meaning in M, for this kind of statement we have a peculiar
situation: bothering to prove it within the Theory is epistemologically irrelevant
in the ambit of the interpretation M. In more simple words, the statement in
question can be a theorem or be undecidable with no difference for the epis-
temological view. Just it cannot be the denial of a theorem, if M is really a
model. So, in any case, the problem of deducing the consistency of the Theory
is beyond the reach of the Theory itself. We propose to call Metatheorem of
undemonstrability internal of consistency this totally general metamathematic
conclusion.
Then, the fact that in a particular hypothetically consistent Theory, such a
statement is a theorem or is undecidable, is depending on the System and on
the specific form of the statement. For Theories that satisfy the assumptions
of the First, Second incompleteness Theorem guarantees that "normally" these
statements are undecidable. We say "normally" because apparently there are
also statements, still expressing consistency of the System in other peculiar
models that, on the contrary, turn out to be theorems of the Theory32. As the
same Lolli says, "it seems that not even a proof shuts discussions"33. But in any
case, as before concluded, this debate cannot affect the validity of the proposed
Metatheorem of undemonstrability internal of consistency.
In conclusion, the Second incompleteness Theorem identifies another class of
essentially undecidable statements for any Theory that satisfies the hypothesis
of the First one. Whilst the First incompleteness Theorem determines only the
Gödel’s statement, the Second extends the undecidability to a much broader cat-
egory of propositions. But, contrary to what is commonly believed, this drastic
generalization does not introduce any new and dramatic epistemological con-
cept about the consistency of the System. It doesn’t, even if the Theorem were
valid for every statement interpretable as "this System is consistent" (which,
we reaffirm, seems to be false). Because by it, in any case, we cannot conclude
that "the System cannot prove its own consistency": this judgment belongs to
32See eg: G. Lolli, Da Euclide a Gödel, ed. Il Mulino (2004), p. 140 y 142 and A.
Martini, Notazioni ordinali e progressioni transfinite di teorie, Thesis Degree, University of
Pisa (2006), p. 11-15, on the Web: http://etd.adm.unipi.it/theses/available/etd-11082006-
161824/unrestricted/tesi.pdf
33G. Lolli, op. cit., p. 142.
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a completely general metatheorem which seems never have been stated, despite
its obviousness and undeniability34.
Often the misreading is aggravated for a sort of incorrect "intuitive proof" of
the Second incompleteness Theorem; that sounds like: "Let S be a System that
satisfies the hypotheses of the First incompleteness Theorem and C its statement
affirming the consistency of S. The First incompleteness Theorem shows that
if S is consistent, the Gödel’s statement, G, is undecidable. Now, if C were
provable, we could deduce that G is undecidable and therefore unprovable. But
since G claims to be itself unprovable, this fact would mean just to prove G,
that is absurd. Therefore, C must be unprovable"35. The flaw is obvious: the
reasoning gives to C and G a semantic value which is certified only assuming
that the System admits a model with such interpretations and therefore already
assuming that it is consistent. In this model there is no doubt that the truth
of C implies the truth of G, but the syntactic implication C→G is a totally
different question. In general, the possibility that C is a theorem causes no
absurd consequence, because that does not imply really the consistency of the
System, as it was observed. On the other hand, in case of inconsistency, maybe
doesn’t happen that every statement is a theorem?
Actually, the syntactic inference C→G is not so trivial and, as noted, it does
not apply in all cases but depends on the symbolic structure of the statement
C.
The only epistemological result of effective importance about the consistency
is due to the Metatheorem of undemonstrability internal of consistency. And we
emphasize that its meta-demonstration, since refers to any arbitrary classical
System, must consist in a purely meta-mathematical reasoning (like that one
we did), ie it cannot be formalized.
——–
In the book, already mentioned, Confines Lógicos de la Matemática36, we
propose other revisions and some proposals to update the terminology of these
arguments, which continues unchanged since the time of Hilbert.
34The consistency of a System may be demonstrated only outside the same, by another
external System. For which, in turn, the problem of consistency arises again. To get out of this
endless chain, the "last" conclusion of consistency has to be purely metamathematic. Actually,
the most general Theory (that demonstrates the consistency of the ordinary mathematic
Disciplines) is the formal Set Theory and the conclusion of its consistency only consists in a
"reasonable conviction".
35See eg: P. Odifreddi, Metamorfosi di un Teorema, (1994), on the Web:
http://www.vialattea.net/odifreddi/godel.htm
36Also in italian: I confini logici della matematica, on ed. Aracne, Bubok, Scribd, Lulu or
Amazon.
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